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Gambling machines and accounting
M B Rodriguez Ferrere, the University of Otago
on accounting for the costs of “pokies” machines
T
he decision in Pub Charity v Department of Internal
Affairs [2013] NZHC 3311 shows the importance of
recognised accounting standards in statutory inter-
pretation, even in the highly-specialised gaming industry.
New Zealand has 17,266 gaming machines and around
$850 million per year is spent using them. The operation of
those machines is classified as “class 4 gambling” by the
Gambling Act 2003, and the Department of Internal Affairs
will only grant class 4 licences to operators who use the
proceeds for an authorised purpose. The distribution of these
proceeds is tightly controlled; the Act and the Gambling
(Class 4 Net Proceeds) Regulations 2004 require operators
to distribute a minimum percentage of the proceeds to the
community (37.12 per cent) and limit the amount that the
operator can use to pay its costs (62.88 per cent).
Pub Charity Ltd is one of New Zealand’s largest gaming
machine operators, with nearly 1,800 machines around the
country. It sought declarations from the Court regarding a
narrow issue: the treatment of gaming machines for account-
ing purposes. Whilst this issue might seem innocuous in the
abstract, viewed globally, the sums involved in the gaming
industry made it worthy of proceedings.
Pub Charity argued that cost of a gaming machine ought
to be fully accounted for in the year it was purchased. The
Department argued that the cost of the machine should be
spread over its lifetime, that is, depreciated. The difference in
approach was relevant to the calculation of net proceeds
under the Act: changes in an operator’s expenses in any given
year would affect its ability to meet minimum distribution
requirements.
The Department’s interpretation was based on interna-
tional accounting standards: not-for-profit organisations,
such as Pub Charity, should “treat the cost of a capital asset
as an expense over its estimated useful life” (at [7]). Pub
Charity’s contrary argument was based on a literal interpre-
tation of the Act. The definition of “net proceeds” in s 4 of
the Act refers to “the actual, reasonable, and necessary costs
[…] incurred in conducting […] gambling”. Pub Charity
argued that the reference to actual costs must mean the actual
purchase price of a machine rather than a smaller depreciated
figure.
That argument relied upon the Supreme Court decision in
Commerce Commission v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd
[2007] NZSC 36, [2007] 3 NZLR 767. There, the Court held
that the plain meaning of “cost of capital” as it appeared in
regulations should be preferred, even if accountants would
treat this as actually meaning “weighted cost of capital”.
Tipping J remarked (at [23]) that “The concept of a plain and
ordinary meaning does not involve the Court having recourse
to external sources such as expert evidence and textbooks. If
the Court has to do that there can hardly be a plain mean-
ing.” Pub Charity argued that similarly, the plain meaning of
“actual cost” ought to be preferred over a depreciated cost,
even if textbooks and expert evidence suggested the contrary.
Simon France J rejected Pub Charity’s argument. Whilst
accepting Tipping J’s approach in Fonterra, he noted it did
not overcome “the fundamental difficulty for Pub Charity
that it in no sense strains the language of the Act to regard a
depreciation expense as an actual cost within the ordinary
meaning of the word” (at [14]). Depreciation was simply a
different method of accounting for the cost of incurred
expenditure; just because it was a cost spread over a period of
time did not mean it fell outside of the ordinary definition of
“actual cost”; a definition excluding depreciation would be
far too narrow.
Pub Charity also argued that a narrow reading of “actual”
that deviated from international accounting standards was
required to support the scheme of the Act. Since the Act
mandated tight control of operators’ expenses, an interpre-
tation ought to avoid the subjectivity involved in determining
depreciation costs. This was rejected by the Court, especially
in light of s 108, which deals with an operator’s annual
report, and refers explicitly to “generally accepted account-
ing practice”. As Simon France J noted, “It would make it
most unexpected to find that elsewhere the Act required
proper accounting approaches to be ignored” (at [21]). Accord-
ingly, the Court preferred the Department’s interpretation.
A second — but quickly dispensed — issue before the
Court was whether the purchase of gaming machines should
be treated as all other expenditure, that is, whether it should
fall part of expenses that cannot exceed 62.88 per cent of an
operator’s proceeds. Pub Charity’s argument for this inter-
pretation was based on the definition of proceeds in reg 3(1)
of the Regulations, which referred to “the turnover of the
gambling […] plus proceeds from the sale of […] gambling
equipment purchased from that turnover”. Pub Charity argued
that the reference to gambling equipment in the definition
made it a special type of expense not subject to the same
constraints. Simon France J disagreed, ruling once again that
Pub Charity’s interpretation was too literal and would under-
mine the purpose of the Regulations in restricting expendi-
ture to that which is necessary and reasonable.
The Department suggested in argument that the motiva-
tion behind the proceedings was Pub Charity’s desire to
prevent new entrants in the market: accounting for the full
cost of gaming machines in the first year of operation would
make it difficult for new entrants to keep to their expenses
within the mandated limits. Simon France J did not find this
policy debate helpful. Instead, the Court adopted a refresh-
ingly commonsense approach to statutory interpretation in
this highly regulated industry, as well as showing the impor-
tance of accounting standards and their ability to displace a
literal interpretation. ❒
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